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INTRODUCTION 
 
Ethnic diversity within Eastern Mediterranean nation states has almost always 
been considered as an embarrassment or/and a potential conflict cause in the 
eyes of their ruling elite. 
 
In fact, after the final dismantling of the multinational and multicultural 
Ottoman Empire at the end of the first World War, most of the countries that 
emerged or just territorially benefited from its defeat, underwent similar nation 
building processes, focusing on the creation of ethnically homogenous 
unicultural nation-states.  
 
Consequently, the elaborate international system of protection for ethnic 
and/or cultural minorities, designed under the aegis of the newly established 
League of Nations, was viewed with suspicion by most of these countries
1. The 
general tendency in Europe in favour of the “nation-state” model
2 after the 
collapse of the most important multinational entities and the way the minority 
protection system was imposed by the victorious great powers, contributed to 
make it particularly unpopular amongst governments and in the public opinion. 
 
Furthermore, excessive sanctification of nationhood and patriotic myths as 
a way to construct a common ethnic identity for all the populations living in 
their interior, often served to legitimise authoritarian schemes in government, 
party structure or national administration. It equally favoured the development 
of revisionist attitudes, transforming same ethnicity communities outside 
national borders into “enslaved brothers” and minority communities inside 
national territory into potential traitors/excuses for foreign intervention in the 
countries’ domestic affairs.  
 
World War II and the end of the interwar world order, brought a legal end 
to almost all these minority protection obligations binding nation states in the 
framework of the League of Nations international system. 
 
However, the passing of some of the South Eastern Mediterranean 
countries under communist rule and the popularity of internationalist ideologies 
in some of the newly emerged or already existing states of the region, did not 
bring significant changes to the way minority communities were viewed by 
respective national authorities. 
 
And even though, nowadays, democratic governance and protection of 
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prominent powers and international organisations of the “new world order”, 
neither the European integration process nor the general tendency in favour of 
multiculturalism has succeeded in eradicating completely nationalistic minded 
policies and national homogenisation objectives from the agendas of the 
regions’ governments and political parties. 
 
The respective attitude of Greece and Turkey, two of the  most rival 
countries of the Eastern Mediterranean framework, towards the minority 
ethnic/cultural communities remaining in their territory after the 1923 mutual 
exchange of populations, does not constitute an exception to the above. 
 
In the following pages, we will try to examine the links between 
democratic consolidation and regional integration on the one hand and the 
Muslim minority of Western Thrace/ the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul 
on the other, in the context of the two countries’ often conflictual relations and 
their common current European orientation. 
 
 
A COMMON ITINERARY 
 
A Common Background 
 
Tension, or even conflict, has never been absent from Greek-Turkish bilateral 
relations.  
 
In fact, even though the two countries have not been at war  with each 
other since the signature of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, the nation building model 
followed by their respective governing elite was highly instrumental  – along 
with a number of other factors – in contributing to the installation of a quasi 




The consequences of the way both nationhood and the neighbouring 
country were perceived in Ankara and Athens are particularly important, not 
only for the populations living in the “wrong side of the border”, but equally for 
the progress of democratic evolution in the interior of the two states . 
 
Greece and Turkey were profoundly transformed after the first World War 
and their bitter 1920-22 conflict which sealed the collapse of their respective 
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In both Ankara and Athens, consolidating national cohesion by 
redesigning its intellectual foundations in the light of regional and international 
realities became a major priority. 
 
In both countries, long periods of authoritarian or even military 
government have been justified by local elite and foreign allies as an unfortunate 
necessity, in order to “safeguard national unity” and “protect” the nation from 
internal and external “ideological or territorial threats”.  
 
And in both states, the vast exchange of populations
4 that followed the 
conflict was believed to be the wisest way to guarantee reciprocal respect of 
frontiers and national homogeneity in their interior
5. 
 
In fact, it was the presence of these “brother” populations that has always 
constituted the main argument of the “revisionist” ambitions, reappearing after 
the end of each one of the numerous wars that followed the establishment of an 
independent Hellenic state in the south of the Balkan peninsula. 
 
The Greek-Orthodox community of Istanbul and the Muslim community 
of Western Thrace were, for various reasons
6, the only ones to escape from this 
exchange of populations, which remains until today an open trauma for those 
brutally obliged to abandon a  still cherished way of life, along with their 
centuries old homes, towns and villages in Crete, Asia Minor, Macedonia and 
Eastern Thrace, or the islands of the Aegean.  
 
Their energetic adherence to the “mother land’s cause
7 (despite the 
attitude of discretion accompanied by regular manifestations of loyalty, which 
traditionally governed their relations with the “infidel” authority), was not 
without long lasting and multiple consequences for inter-community relations 
and democracy in Greece and Turkey respectively.  
 
A Religion-based Organisation 
  
The socio-economic situation of these minorities and the respective “strategic 
importance” they have for Greek and Turkish decision-makers in the context of 
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Nevertheless and notwithstanding the significant differences of their 
respective socio-economic characteristics, both communities have in common 
an internal organisation and mentality highly marked by the religion based 
Ottoman “millet” system.  
 
Cosmopolitan and quite wealthy in the past, the Greek-Orthodox minority 
of the former imperial capital, which is still counting a number of intellectuals, 
industrialists and merchants among its members, is a community mainly 
organised around its religious institutions.
 
In fact, as the titular head of Eastern Orthodox Christianity, the 
community’s supreme religious leader occupied a prominent position in the 
Ottoman administration and was vested with an extended temporary authority 
over all the Orthodox and a number of the other Christian subjects of the Sultan. 
 
Today, the “Ecumenical patriarch” remains the incontestable leader of the 
minority, whilst the impressive amount of the church’s activities outside Turkey 
earned the institution an important international prestige. 
 
For most of the Istanbuliot Greeks, Orthodoxy is one of the basic 
constituents of their ethnic/cultural identity, along with their consciousness that 
they form an integral and even quite important, part of the Hellenic nation, the 
later conceived through a rather glorifying version of its history. 
 
For the Western Thracian Muslim minority, mainly composed of farmers, 
tobacco merchants and recently, of an urban middle class, religion constitutes 
one of the basic elements of community conscience. 
 
In fact, the lack of linguistic and ethnic homogeneity inside this 
community, despite the predominance of the Turkish language among its 
members and the efforts to construct a common Turkish identity, is 
counterbalanced by a strong feeling of adherence to Islam
8 and a quasi 
unanimous strict respect for traditional and conservative social practises.  
 
Furthermore, the persistence of an administration of religious nature, in 
the face of the three Mufti who still administer official j ustice in personal low 
affairs of the minority
9 and the importance of the religious curriculum of public 
education in minority schools, little prepares this community to open itself to 
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This strong religious affiliation is decisive for these communities’ 
perception of themselves, as in opposition with the “others”. It is equally 
decisive for the majority’s conception of “otherness” and the impact both 
conceptions have in inter-community relations.  
 
Reciprocally Guaranteed Rights 
 
The Treaty of Lausanne 
 
Even though Greece and Turkey are nowadays parts of a considerable number of 
international Conventions on Human Rights and cultural/ethnic diversity, the 
Treaty signed in Lausanne on 24 July 1923, is still widely regarded in both 
countries as the main legal instrument guaranteeing reciprocal respect for 
minority rights. 
 
In fact, its minority clauses are the only ones (along with the Declaration 
of Finland on the Aaland islands) of such obligations adopted in the post World 
War I context that still apply to their signatories after the establishment of the 
UN.  
 
These clauses, along with the 1923 “Convention between Greece and 
Turkey concerning the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations”, were the 
fruit of long and painful negotiations, which started soon after the victory of 
Mustafa Kemal’s troops over the Greeks in September 1922. The continuation 
of the Allied occupation of Istanbul and the neutral zone during these 
negotiations played a significant role in their outcome.  
 
According to the article 2 of the exchange Convention : “The following 
persons shall not be included in the exchange provided for in Article 1.: (a) The 
Greek inhabitants of Constantinople (b) The Moslem inhabitants of Western 
Thrace. All Greeks who were already established before October 1918 within 
the areas under the prefecture of the City of Constantinople, as defined by the 
law of 1912, shall be considered as Greek inhabitants of Constantinople. All 
Moslems established in the region to the east of the frontier line laid down in 
1913 by the Treaty of Bucharest shall be considered as Moslem inhabitants of 
Western Thrace”. 
 
The indigenous Greek populations of the (at that time) mainly Greek 
inhabited islands Bozcaada (Tenedos) and Gökçeada (Imvros) i n the Aegean 
archipelago are equally exempted from the exchange and granted a limited 
autonomy status inside Turkey (clause 14 of the Lausanne Treaty).  
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At the end of its deliberation in 1934, after long negotiations over the 
definition and the number of  the “established” non-exchangeable, the question 
of the properties of the exchangeable and some bitter incidents that raised 
mutual mistrust
10, the Mixed Committee of Greek, Turkish and neutral experts 
supervising the population exchange has issued 106.000  certificates of non-
exchangeability to Western Thracian Moslems
11. 
 
The reinstallation of a great number of Greek refugees from the Turkish to 
the Greek part of Thrace, along with the ongoing tension between the two 
countries, forced some of them to choose  immigration and changed the 
demographic character of the region. The number of the remaining ones 
corresponded to approximately 27% of the total of the region’s population
12, 
whilst this community represented the 40.8% of the inhabitants of Western 
Thrace according to the interallied census of 1920
13.  
 
In a report prepared by the same Mixed Committee in 1934, their Greek 
counterparts in Turkey were estimated at 111.200 (125.046 according to the 
Turkish census of 1935). In this estimation were included the 30.000 non-
exchangeable Istanbuliot Greeks of Hellenic nationality and the 8.200 Greek 
inhabitants of Gökçeada and Bozcaada
14. 
 
Official statistics saw a significant demographic change in that case too. 
According to the 1924 data, Constantinople, a major cosmopolitan city, had 
1.065.866 inhabitants, with Greeks representing 26.24%. Only three years later, 
their population corresponded only to 11.5% of Istanbuls’ 806.993 citizens, 
while the departure of a considerable number of Christians, Jews and other 




Clauses 37 to 44 of the Lausanne Treaty set out the obligations the new 
republican Turkish state undertakes towards these “Turkish subjects belonging 
to non-Moslem minorities” and towards “all inhabitants of Turkey without 
distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or religion”.  
 
They provide mainly for their equal treatment in the eyes of the law in all 
matters, their right to use, learn and teach “non-Turkish language”, freedom for 
their religious observances, a distinct family law and personal status as well as 
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Furthermore, Turkey undertook the obligation to recognise clauses 38 to 
44 as  fundamental laws, committing itself that “no law, no regulation, nor 
official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any 
law, regulation, nor official action prevail over them”. 
 
The clause 45 of the Treaty ensures the reciprocal character of the above 
mentioned engagements, stipulating that “The rights conferred by the provisions 
of the present Section on the non-Moslem minorities of Turkey will be similarly 
conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in her territory”. A Convention 
between Greece and the allied powers (Sevres, 1920), guaranteeing the 
continuation of the special social and religious status of Thracian Moslems by 
the Hellenic state, has equally started to apply as of 1924. 
 
Turkey did not undertake any Treaty obligations concerning the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, supreme religious authority of the Greek community of 
Istanbul and “primus inter pares” amongst the Orthodox churches 
internationally. 
 
In fact, the rather obvious anti-Turkish activities of the institution during 
the years that followed the Ottoman defeat at World War I, its energetic 
international lobbying in favour of the Hellenic cause and the secularist ideology 
of the Kemalist regime, made the Greek efforts to maintain its see in Istanbul 
particularly difficult. 
 
The Patriarchate’s expulsion from Turkey, energetically demanded by the 
Turkish negotiators in Lausanne, was finally avoided because of intense 
international pressure against it
16.  
 
A Turkish verbal engagement allowing it to remain in the Phanar “with all 
its organisations and constituent bodies”, but without any political or non-
ecclesiastic attributes, was finally embodied in the Lausanne proceedings. 
However, the failure of the Patriarchates’ allies to obtain a written guarantee of 
its privileges and international character was not without decisive consequences 
for the future of the institution in an officially secular country, dominated by an 
actively anticlerical and nationalistic-minded elite
17.  
 
It is interesting to note that whilst the possibility of an abrogation of this 
Treaty has never seemed to be unimaginable or even undesirable for Turkish 
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The symbolic importance of the Patriarchate, considered to be the nations’ 
last link with a still quite regretted and idealised imperial past, constitutes today 
the main reason for this obstinacy in conserving the Lausanne framework which 
could be regarded as somehow outdated, in the light of the recent international 
evolutions in matters of human rights. 
 
Modern International Protection of Human/Minority Rights 
 
Notwithstanding the reluctance and suspicion which both Ankara and Athens 
have always manifested towards international legal protection of minority or/and 
human rights, their common “western” orientation made their participation in 
the major instruments of such a protection almost unavoidable. 
 
The two countries have often found themselves on the same side in 
forums such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Council of Europe or the European Convention on Human Rights, 
defending the inviolability of the states’ sovereignty in internal matters and 
presenting more or less flattering, self prepared reports on the “impeccable” 
application of human/minority rights inside their respective national territories. 
The uneasiness of both countries about international instruments of such nature 
is equally betrayed by their considerable delays in ratifying them. 
 
In fact, the “traumatic” phases Greek-Turkish relations have known in the 
last two centuries and the bitter experience of the two states with populations 
having particularistic loyalties inside their national frontiers, contributed to their 
adoption of a completely formalistic, legal approach of the minority rights’ 
question. 
 
Thus, the framework provided for by Lausanne is considered by both 
Greek and Turkish decision-makers as less dangerous for the preservation of 
their respective countries’ ethnic homogeneity, than the m odern tendency to 
internationalise this kind of issues. Its provisions have been several times cited 
by respective officials as a proof of the non-existence of other ethnic minorities 
in their territories, while there is no permanent impartial organ for the solution 
of the potential problems generated in its’ framework.
19 
   
However, it is true that, with the exception of the efficient but still quite 
conservative system of the European Convention on Human Rights, the non-
binding character of most of the other international acts of similar nature 
(notably the 1990 OSCE Copenhagen document, the OSCE Commissioner for 
Human rights and minorities and the 1995 Convention Frame for the protection 
of national minorities) makes them much less committing in the eyes of 
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countries profoundly attached to the concept of national sovereignty and that, 
despite their high symbolic value. 
 
Today, what seems to be the irrevocable commitment of Ankara and 
Athens to the European integration process, is susceptible to bringing substantial 
changes to the above mentioned attitude of the two states towards augmenting 
international concern for human rights issues. 
 
A common difficult evolution towards democracy and European 
integration. 
 
The trajectory of democratic consolidation has been a quite difficult one in both 
Greece and Turkey. 
 
Since the collapse of the “great idea” that marked Hellenic internal and 
foreign politics from the country’s independence to 1922
20, Greece has 
experienced several periods of dictatorship, authoritarian g overnment and 
political instability, as well as a bloody civil war, which divided the country for 
many decades after its end and generated strong bitter passions, still persisting 
among those who participated in it.  
 
Successive governments in Athens, notwithstanding their proclaimed 
ideological affiliation or the means of their accession to power, have followed 
quite similar policies concerning common identity building and internal national 
unity. 
 
Achieving and consolidating an ethnic, cultural and religious homogeneity 
of the state on the basis of the “Hellenic-Christian heritage” constituted the main 
guideline of these policies.  
 
Supported by the particularly influential Orthodox church, and diffused by 
public education, legislation and media, an idealised, mythical conception of 
Hellenic nationhood was popularised to such an extend that it is still quite a 
taboo to challenge it in the internal official or even popular discourse.  
 
According to that conception, the nation is the direct heir of the glorious 
classic and Byzantine ancestors, the defender of the “true faith” and the bastion 
of civilisation, surrounded by “barbarian” enemies or jealous friends.
21  
 
Neighbouring Turkey and Communism shared for many decades the first 
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the official identity construction scheme. The impact of the latter’s dominance in 
Greek political life on those inside the country who, by birth or ideological 
conviction, were susceptible to sympathise with Ankara “the eternal enemy” or 
Moscow the “ungodly”, was obviously immense.  
 
The way the complications of the Cyprus questions were perceived by the 
majority of Greeks since the 1950s and the emergence of a “new world order” 
after the collapse of the Soviet bloc, reinforced the credibility of the above 
mentioned conception of Hellenic nationhood, both inside the country and 
amongst the diaspora.  
 
The persistence of the nationalistic self-conceptions’ popularity, despite 
the return to multiparty democracy in the 1970s and the state’s accession to the 
European Community in the 1980s , has negative consequences for the country’s 
reputation in matters of human rights and respect for cultural/ethnic difference. 
 
In fact, even though the Hellenic Republic i s today a “western 
democracy” and a member of the European Union, the Constitution of 
1975/1986 (art.1.3) stipulates that “all powers derive from the people (and) exist 
in favour of them  and of the nation”, the “indissoluble union between 
Orthodoxy and Hellenism”
22 continues to be officially proclaimed by statesmen 
during public ceremonies, whilst religious affiliation is still mentioned on police 
delivered identity cards.  
 
Furthermore, the Greek political figures, press and public opinion, seem to 
be rather hostile towards multiculturalism and manifestations of ethnic 
difference inside the country
23. 
 
In that framework, it is interested to note that, despite the fact that the 
country is one of the most linguistically, ethnically and religiously homogenous 
ones in Europe and thus has little to fear from potential “separatism” 
movements, its administration actively refuses to recognise the existence of any 
other “particular’ group inside the national territory, apart from the Moslem 
minority of Western Thrace, as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne. The subject 
constitutes a taboo even for the scientific community. The latter is often auto-
restricted to a sterile defence of more or less official positions, even though the 
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Such an insistence in a rather outdated view of national belonging 
interconnected to religious creeds, costs the country several condemning 
decisions in the framework of the European Convention on Human Rights, as 
well as numerous negative comments from international non-governmental 
organisations active in the human rights field. At the same time, it constitutes 
the last serious incoherence in the Greece’s otherwise remarkable 
transformation, from a military governed, quasi fascist state from 1967 to 1974, 
to an active EU member, ready to join the economic and monetary union in 
2001. 
 
Turkey, on the other hand, has equally experienced three military regimes 
and a long authoritarian one-party system since the dismantling of the Ottoman 
Empire and the civil war that preceded the proclamation of the Republic. 
 
Nowadays, even though the Turkish political system is widely considered 
to be the most “western style” one amongst the Middle-Eastern states of Moslem 
majority, the traditionally nationalistic minded army still plays a prominent and 
even constitutionally guaranteed role in decision making (art. 118.3, Const. of 
1982, installing the “National Security Council”), whilst the Republic is 
officially proclaimed to be “ loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk” (art. 2,Const. of 
1982). 
 
In fact, the nation building model, initiated by the founder of the modern 
Turkish state and still quite faithfully followed by his successors, has 
transformed nationhood into almost a r eligion through the state controlled 
compulsory education system and the official sanctification of patriotism, of a 
mythic version of Turkish history and of Kemal Ataturk’s personality.  
 
Governing elite in Ankara and public opinion in the country has never 
completely overcome the trauma of the 1918-1922 foreign occupation and the 
enthusiasm with which minority communities welcomed it around the country. 
 
Thus, besides its fear of Kurdish separatism, successive Turkish 
governments continue to treat the remaining non-Moslem minorities as agents of 
a potential invader, despite their currently insignificant numerical proportions. 
 
         Furthermore, the state energetically denies the existence of any other 
minority community inside its borders but the Lausanne recognised ones and 
actively tries to restrict any kind of “distinct” or “non-Turkish” identity 
manifestation, including pro-minority rights voices coming from Turkish 
scholars and human rights activists . 
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Turkey’s particular relationship with Islam, the religion professed by the 
vast majority of its citizens, is another obstacle to the country’s road towards 
democratic governance. 
 
An officially secular state (art.2, 1982 Const.), considering anti-
secularism propaganda as punishable by law (Art. 163 of the Penal Code), the 
Turkish Republic has been repressive towards partisans of a more Islamic 
approach to national politics, denying them the right to form political parties or 
prohibiting the wearing of religious garments in public places and the existence 
of religious orders. 
 
At the same time, Turkey is a member of all the major international 
Islamic organisations, strictly controls the formation of preachers, imposes 
compulsory “instruction in religious culture and moral education (art.24, 1982 
Const.)” , whilst officials often stress the importance of the links between Islam 
and the Turkish nation in public ceremonies
25. 
 
The analysis of the numerous and complicated reasons of such a 
contradiction does not directly concern the subject of the present paper. 
However, it is interesting to note that this contradiction is not without 
consequences for the religious, ethnic and cultural minorities of the country and 
for the state’s evolution towards democratic governance.  
 
The numerous condemnations of Ankara f or human rights abuses by a 
considerable number of international organisations and the authoritarian 




In the light of the above, Turkey’s potential EU membership might 
constitute a real chance in the country’s difficult path to democracy. Such an 
evolution though is still endangered by the uneasy relations with Greece, the still 
unsettled problem of Cyprus, the Kurdish issue and the popularity  of ultra-
nationalistic or Islamic political parties amongst a public tired of the continuous 
war in the eastern provinces and impoverished by urbanisation, corruption and 
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THE “STRATEGIC” IMPORTANCE OF WESTERN THRACIAN 
MOSLEMS AND ISTANBULIOT GREEKS 
 
The Moslem communities of Western Thrace 
 
Concentrated in the three prefectures of Rodopi, Xanthi and Evros, the Moslem 
minority of Western Thrace owns its cohesion to a strong attachment to the land 
and to traditional Islamic values.  
 
The exact number of its’ members is difficult to define accurately since 
language and religion do not figure anymore in Greek censuses. According to 
minority sources, Western-Thracian Moslems are estimated to be around 
150.000, as opposed to Greek and international sources who claim they are 
between 120.000 and 130.000.
27 
 
All of the above mentioned numbers do not represent more than the 1.5% 
of the total population of Greece. However, the community’s percentage in the 
population of the region of Thrace and in each one of its’ respective prefectures 
is far more important. 
 
Independent sources, estimate Thracian Moslems to represent 
approximately between 35% and 37% of the regions inhabitants (the population 
of Thrace is 338.005 according to the Greek census of 1991) and they are 
believed to be even more numerically important in Xanthi and Rodopi.
28  
 
The ethnic composition of the minority has never been a homogenous one 
even though the Turkish element has always been dominant.  
 
The census conducted by the allied occupation authorities of the region in 
1919-1920 divides the Moslem population of Western Thrace between Turks 
(73.220), Pomaks (11.739) and Moslem Gypsies (1.834). Approximately 2.000 
Circasians, mostly soldiers who helped the Greek army during the 1920-1922 




Ethnic Turks nowadays constitute the dominant element of the minority. 
More numerous, wealthy and politically active than the other constituents of the 
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class amongst them. Their number is estimated to represent between 68% and 
48% of its’ population (approximately 60.000)
30.  
              
Moslem Gypsies are mostly concentrated in the Alexandroupolis 
prefecture. Their community, is estimated to represent 18% of the Moslem 
population of Western Thrace (approximately 25.000)
31. 
 
Even though most of the rest of the minority has somehow looked down 
on them in the past, an integration of these  “Roma” to the Greek Moslem 
community took place in the last decades, with consequences in their language 
and education practises. Today, Turkish tends to replace their native “Romany” 
language of oral tradition even in everyday use, whilst an increase in s chool 
attendance is equally observed amongst their youngsters. Notwithstanding this 
evolution, illiteracy is still higher amongst young and elder Gypsies than 
amongst any other population of the Western Thracian Moslem community. 
 
Pomaks constitute another distinct community with ethnic origins 
disputed by Greece, Turkey and Bulgaria (where their population is estimated 
from 120.000 to 250.000) . They speak a language close to Bulgarian with 
Greek and Turkish idioms (Pomahtsu) and their customs have Slavic, Greek and 
Turkish influences
32. Most of them still live in mountainous villages and are 
known “for their piety and their blind devotion to the Prophet”
33.  
 
Historically, the community has not always been on best terms with the 
Turkish element of the minority. Their attachment to religion and traditional 
values made them reject Ankara’s calls for adjustment to the Kemalist reforms, 
whilst a considerable number of them collaborated with the Bulgarian 
occupation forces of the region in 1941-1944, in opposition to their persecuted 
Turkish co-religionists
34. Nowadays, Pomaks are estimated to represent between 
22% and 30% (approximately 35.000 people) of the total minority population
35.  
 
In recent years, the spread of the Turkish language amongst Western 
Thracian M oslems of Pomak origin and the general emergence of a Turkish 
identity in a large part of the minority, generated a number of public and private 
Greek initiatives in favour of teaching Pomahtsu in the community’s schools. A 
primary school reading book, a g rammar book, two dictionaries and children 
books have already been published in Pomahtsu. The official introduction of this 
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minority circles as an attempt to divide the community. It has equally been 




In fact, the Greek-Turkish educational agreements of 1951 and 1968 
concerning, amongst other things, the teaching of standard Turkish
37 in all the 
Western Thracian minority schools, gave Turkish a de facto status of vernacular 
language amongst the Greek Moslem community.  
 
The negligence Athenian governments saw in promoting Greek-
Turkish/Pomahtsu/Romani bilingualism and alphabetisation in the ranks of the 
Moslem population or in organising a higher education appealing to both the 
Christian and the Minority element of the region contributed to the above
38. In 
parallel, press and radio-television programs, both from within the minority in 
question and from n eighbouring Turkey, accentuated even more the 
predominance of the Turkish language and culture
39, thus facilitating the 
emergence of a Turkish-Muslim ethnic identity tending to minimise the 
importance of belonging in distinct ethnic groups.  
 
This integration process of the three ethnic constituents of the religious 
minority’s population, begun during the 1930s with the Venizelos-Ataturk 
rapprochement, which provided for the creation of a Turkish Consulate General 




In the years that followed, successive Greek governments have favoured 
this evolution for various reasons, despite the obvious Turkization of the 
minority such a process was implying. 
 
The guarantee of reciprocal rights for the Greek minority of Istanbul was 
never the principal one of these reasons. In fact, Athens was either eager to 
obtain security for its eastern borders at a time when invasion was feared from 
elsewhere ( 1930s) or obliged to satisfy its major Atlantic allies in order to 
consolidate its’ regime and to gain sympathies for its cause in Cyprus. 
 
The eclipse of the “communist danger” and the installation of multiparty 
democracy, along with the effect that created in Greece the evolutions in the 
Cyprus issue as of 1974 and more recently the success of two independent 
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election, persuaded the Greek government to modify its’ attitude towards the 
minority and the region in general
41. 
 
Suggestions that the pro-Turkish sympathies of a part of the minority 
population might transform the latter into a “fifth column” of Ankara in case of 
a potential bilateral conflict or even into a pretext for Turkish claims on Greek 
soil, have always been advanced in the past by politicians from all sides and by a 
part of the Greek press. 
  
But such fears have been given added credibility by the openly professed 
irredentism of most of the associations of Western Thracian Moslem 
immigrants, suspected to receive Turkish financial help
42, or by the equally 
revisionist discourse of radio-television programmes, broadcast to Greek 
territory by high powered transmitters installed for that purpose on the other side 
of the bilateral border. 
 
The insistence of the two independent minority MPs to describe as 
“Turkish” the Western Thracian Moslem community as a whole and their 
attempts to attract international attention on what they believed to by a Greek 
denial of the minority’s “Turkish” ethnic identity, increased  further Hellenic 
worries. 
 
Official efforts to win Moslem loyalties through education or control of 
religious institutions were met by the multiplication of outspoken grievances 
within the community elite and by numerous electronic and written press 
publications fiercely condemning “Greek oppression”
43.  
 
As a reaction, voices have been raised, both among Greek political figures 
and through the media, in favour of a strict respect of the Lausanne’s reciprocity 
provisions, with all the consequences such a move might imply given the 
enormous reduction of the Istanbouliot Greeks. In the Thracian region itself, the 
local Orthodox church, local politicians and Greek public opinion manifested 




Successive Greek governments were further annoyed by the results of the 
last two official censuses in Western Thrace. In fact, from 345.220 in 1981, the 
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of the Moslem population was estimated to be three times greater than the one of 
their fellow citizens of Orthodox religion.  
 
All of the above evolutions, along with the geopolitical/strategic 
importance of the Moslem minority’s location in Greek territory, have 
persuaded many among the Hellenic political elite that “the already shaken 
balances of Lausanne might be reversed with ‘known’ consequences”
45.  
  
Consequently, the electoral law has been changed soon after the 1990 
elections in order to render impossible  the election of independent minority 
candidates
46, the use of the world “Turkish” to describe “Greek citizens of 
Moslem religion” was officially prohibited by decision of the High Court as a 
“threat to public order”
47 (many minority NGOs have been outlawed a s a 
consequence)
48 and a new law has been adopted enabling the state to appoint the 
Muftis, highest juridical and religious authority of the Western Thracian 
Moslem community
49.  
   
It is interesting to note that these restrictive measures, to which one should 
add the numerous trials of prominent members of the minority’s press and 
political elite for “spreading false rumours” or “dividing the people” have not 
caused anything more than discrete diplomatic reaction from the Turkish side. 
 
The latter’s efforts t o achieve EU candidate status, obtain European 
financial help and resolve its’ own thorny internal problems are probably not 
stranger to the above. 
 
Minority political figures on the other hand, have profited from the 
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights in order to achieve 
international, legally binding condemnation of Greece for alleged breaking of 
minority/human rights related provisions.  
 
In some cases, as in the one of Dr. A. Sadik’s suit against Greece 
(18877/91) for forbidding him to use the word “Turkish” referring to the 
Moslem minority, the report of the European Committee for Human Rights 
condemned the Greek attitude as “non necessary in a democratic society”
50  
 
On the other hand, the ever more active engagement of the EU with “the 
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liberties”
51 and the pressures upon the country to ameliorate its performance in 
human rights issues ( which reached their peak with the State Department 
Report of 1991) moved Greek governments towards a restructuring of its 
minority politics. 
 
In that context, two of the issues negatively affecting democratic 
governance in the country and the Moslem minority as such, have been 
positively settled in recent years. 
 
In 1995, Greece abolished the “restricted military zone regime” applying 
to the mountainous, mostly Moslem inhabited area of the three prefectures of 
Western Thrace as of 1936. The measure, adopted at the time of general 
Metaxas fascist regime and maintained during Cold War years (the military zone 
was bordering with Bulgaria), provided for military checkpoints at of all roads 
leading to the area in question, special identity cards for its inhabitants and 
special short time permissions for visitors, as well as for the prohibition of 
access from midnight to 5 AM. 
  
The abolition, in 1998 of the “infamous” article 19 of the Greek 
Citizenship Code of 1955 providing for the deprivation of Greek nationality 
from “persons of non-Greek origin, leaving Greece without the intention of 
returning, persons of non-Greek origin born and domiciled abroad and minor 
children whose parents or surviving parent have lost the same” was the second 
important positive step. This article, adopted also during Cold War times, has 
been used in the past to deprive many members of the minority of their Greek 
nationality, whilst its racial foundation had been a permanent cause of severe 
criticism towards Greece by international bodies. 
 
The recent Greek-Turkish rapprochement and Turkey’s EU candidate 
status m ight attenuate the, still very present conception of the minority as a 
potential conflict source in the eyes of Greek officials and public opinion.  
 
In what it is concerned, Turkey is equally susceptible to refraining from 
encouraging the emergence of ultra-nationalistic or revisionist tendencies 
amongst Western Thracian Moslems.  
 
This latter group, “a closed and somewhat suspicious community, 
which…have neither assimilated nor adopted twentieth century life”, composed 
of “simple, hardworking and intelligent people”
52 does not wish to be considered 
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The Greek-Orthodox community of Istanbul 
 
A mere shadow of its past, the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul seems to be 
a community destined to disappear. 
 
In fact, the number of Istanbuliot Greeks, which never ceased to decline 
since the end of World War II is nowadays estimated to be between 2.500 and 
5.000 (the question of religious affiliation is not anymore asked in Turkish 
censuses). Most of these Greek-Orthodox Turkish citizens are old, whilst the 
immigration rate is particularly high amongst the few remaining youngsters
53.  
 
The minority had indeed a strategic position before the first World War 
and during the 1918-1922  conflict period, when its number and the prominent 
role many of its members played in the city’s life, made its leaders feel they 
could effectively lobby for autonomy or even annexation to the Hellenic State
54. 
 
The persistence of the bitter memories of that time in both the Turkish 
public opinion and governing elite along with the latter’s consciousness of the 
symbolic importance the community still has for Greece are actually the reasons 
of its spectacular decline. 
 
Since the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, Greek-Orthodox have been 
subjected to a quite selective application of secularism and equality legal 
provisions, aiming to reduce the role of minorities in the new Turkish state, 
eager not to repeat the faults of its imperial predecessor.  
 
This attitude reached its peak during the 1942-1944 period, with the 
adoption of the “varlik vergisi”, a capital tax dividing citizens according to their 
religious beliefs and aiming at destroying Christian and Jewish owned 
businesses by imposing them to pay ten times  the amount demanded for 
Moslems with equal wealth. 
 
The emergence of the Cyprus issue in the 1950s definitely sealed the 
minority’s fate. During the “Saint Barthelemy night” of the 6/7 September 1955 
and whilst the Tripartite London Conference was holding important negotiations 
on Cyprus, mobs, fanaticised after a bomb explosion in front of the house of 
Ataturk in Thessaloniki, caused widespread damage to Greek community and 
private property everywhere in Istanbul, terrorising the minority population with 
police tolerance
55. Interestingly enough, grievances of the Greek government, 
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place in Western Thrace. However and despite the official trials and 
condemnations of alleged responsible, the Greek-orthodox minority never 
recovered from the incident.  
 
Today the imposition of numerous restrictions to all non Moslem 
communities of Istanbul by the officially secular Turkey, such as the 1971 
prohibition from purchasing new “vakif” property despite the provisions of the 
clause 43 of the Lausanne Treaty, testify to Ankara’s persistence in the model of 
perfect national homogeneity and to the limits of its current democratisation 
process.  
 
The absolutely insignificant percentage these communities represent 
inside the state (0.2%)
56 de facto deprives them today of any possible separatist 
ambitions, whilst their international ties could transform them into efficient 
ambassadors of the country’s image once respect for their rights is ensured. 
 
But  if the Greek-Orthodox minority of Istanbul, “still undergoing an 
irreversible eclipse”
57, is deprived of everything but purely emotional/symbolic 
importance, its religious leadership continues to play a significant international 
role, which has even increased in the course of the last decade, due to the fall of 
communist rule in Eastern European countries of Orthodox majority. 
 
In fact, the “Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople-New Rome” is the 
first amongst equals in the hierarchy of the Orthodox church,  numbering 
approximately 200.000 members around the world. 
   
Besides this important faction, the Patriarch and his Synod residing in the 
Fener district, in Istanbul, name bishops in the Dodecanese, supervise 
autonomous Orthodox churches in Crete, Finland and Estonia and directly 
administer the Greek-Orthodox communities of the Hellenic diaspora. 
 
The last ones, particularly well organised in North America and Australia, 
often use their solid local connections to lobby in favour of the Patriarcate’s 
rights and Greek government’s causes under the guidance of Istanbul-appointed 
bishops, thus adding credibility to the suspicion with which Turkish public 
opinion and officials view the institution ever since its active pro-Greek position 
during the Anatolian war. 
 
Financially supported by the Greek government and the communities of 
the diaspora, the Patriarchate has intensified its international activities since the 




RSCAS 2001/19 © 2001 Theodoros G. Koutroubas  21 




Further more the traditionally close interconnection between church and 
state in countries of Orthodox majority
59 links the institution with most of the 
governments of Turkey’s Balkan neighbours and Russia, whilst the 
establishment of active Theological schools and study centres in Europe and 
America gained friendships for the “Great Church of Christ” amongst Western 
intellectuals. 
 
Despite this world-wide recognised importance, the Patriarchate is 
officially regarded by Ankara as a uniquely Turkish internal institution, existing 
for the spiritual needs of the country’s few remaining Greek-Orthodox and 




In that spirit, the Turkish government continues to impose the obligation 
of Turkish citizenship to the tenant of the See and the members of the Synod , 
thus making doubtful the endurance of the Patriarchate after the approaching 
disappearance of the minority. 
 
It equally reserves the right to eliminate candidates to the Patriarchal 
dignity who are not judged compatible with Turkish interests, with obvious 
negative consequences for the institution’s international credibility
61. 
 
Finally, the 1971 law forbidding private institutions for higher education 
has deprived the Patriarchate of the Halki Faculty of theology in Heybeliada, its 
only training centre for clerics inside Turkey. Notwithstanding intense 
international and Greek pressure for the abolishment of this prohibition
62, the 
non-reopening of the school adds considerably to the uncertainty of the 
Patriarchates’ future in the Turkish Republic.  
 
Quite curiously, the latter has rarely tried to profit from the existence of 
such a prestigious international institution inside its national borders and limited 
itself to its use as a mean of pressure on successive Greek governments, which 
are usually adopting a rather emotional approach to the issue. 
The Patriarchate’s active support to the Turkish request for EU 
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and the efficient help it provided during the recent earthquakes, have somehow 
gained sympathies for the institution in press and public opinion
63. 
 
At a time when calls are multiplying for the right of the Ecumenical 
Throne to maintain the location of his ancient see in a modern and democratic 
Turkey, an eventual change of the country’s attitude towards it, could transform 
this institution from an arm against a neighbour into a tool for making new 
friends. 
 
On the other side, Greek nationalistic-minded decision makers should 
equally cease to regard the Patriarchate as the last link with an idealised national 
past or as the remaining bastion of Hellenism inside what was the capital of the 
Byzantine Orthodox Empire. Greece’s de-connection from the institution’s own 
policies could greatly help the latter to affirm its international nature, whilst it 
would equally be of great service to bilateral relations. 
 
 
MINORITY RIGHTS AND DEMOCRATIC EVOLUTION 
  
Democracy is not a top down imposed political system, but rather a 
constantly ongoing process, implying evolution of mentalities through education 
and continuous challenge of the each time achieved level of popular 
participation in the public affairs of the “city”. 
 
Greece is today a member of the EU whilst Turkey seems to be 
irrevocably oriented towards European integration and thus committed to 
promote democratic governance and respect for human rights inside its borders. 
 
A European democratic future appears to be in fact the only possible 
choice for both countries. 
 
Opting out of the EU or adopting politics susceptible to lead it to isolation 
would most probably create serious economic problems and a major internal 
instability in Greece whose financial and foreign policies are based largely on 
the country’s European membership. 
 
Turkey’s exclusion from the European process would most likely oblige 
the country to orient its diplomacy towards its’ Middle Eastern environment. 
Such an option creates serious fears amongst the “Kemalist” elite in power 
which does not wish to put in danger the country’s current achievements in 
matters of democratic governance and secularisation. The same elite is 
particularly sensitive to the impact such an evolution would have for Turkey’s 
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international prestige as a natural intermediate between the West and the Islamic 
world.  
 
In this context, the two respective minorities have more than ever the 
chance to serve as “a ‘uniting link’ between the two nations, …(to) be a help, 




Some of the possible conditions for a successful transformation of 
Western Thracian Moslems and Istanbouliot Greeks/ the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate into factors of strengthening for the regional integration process and 
of deepening for democratic governance and human rights respect, might be the 
following: 
 
a.  Profound secularisation of legislation and administrative practises in 
both countries. Absolute religious neutrality of the state. Religious 
institutions should of course enjoy every possible liberty in the 
exercise of their proper functions without any state interference.  
b.  Spread of education amongst all the elements of the country’s 
population. 
c.  Development and encouragement of the dissemination, through 
education and media, of historical approaches meant to limit mutual 
bitterness and mistrust. 
d.  Encouragement of interest (equally through education and media), for 
cultures different than the country’s dominant one,. 
e.  Development and encouragement of “difference respect” policies and 
campaigns on a national level. 
f.  Development and encouragement of cultural interactions between the 
minority communities and the other parts of the country’s population.  
g.  Promotion of civic values rather than ethnic identity as a model of 
consolidating national unity. 
h.  Encouragement of development projects in regions/suburbs with big 
percentages of minority population. Encouragement of such 
population’s direct implication in the realisation of these projects. 
i.  Encouraging minority immigrants to maintain ties with their countries 
of birth. 
j.  Encouragement and facilitation of the full participation of minority 
populations in the countries cultural, economical, social and political 
life. 
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At a time when the European Union, in plain negotiation with future members, 
is affirming more than ever its will to constitute an entity based on democracy, 
liberty and respect for human rights and in view of the benefits generated by 
“the end of divisions in the European continent” Western Thracian Moslem and 
Istanbuliot Greeks do have a role to play. 
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